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Abstract 
 
 
 
This dissertation will serve to investigate the deconstruction of the liberal humanist 
vision of the ‘self’ through a posthumanist reading of the two dystopian novels Oryx 
and Crake and The Windup Girl by Margaret Atwood and Paolo Bacigalupi 
respectively.  
 By engaging with these two novels, this dissertation will focus primarily on a 
posthumanist reading of the texts and analyse the perceived image of the nineteenth 
century ‘man’ and discuss the possible disappearance of this view of what it means to 
be a human being. The introduction will explain the differences between the liberal 
humanist subject, the transhumanist subject and the posthumanist subject. The main 
body of the dissertation will then discuss key issues surrounding these three subjects. 
 By focusing on epistemic shifts, the blurring of boundaries between humans 
and animals and the end of a capitalistic model of living, this dissertation serves to 
prove how these two novels expose the threat that the liberal humanist subject poses 
to itself and highlights the inevitable move to the posthuman. This dissertation also 
serves to discuss the possibility of the human and posthuman being able to survive 
together. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Pinpointing the Human: The emergence of the posthuman and rejection of the 
‘self’ through the rejection of traditional humanist values.  
 
 
Typically male subject. Centre of his world, that being the world. Defined by an 
extreme, rational intelligence and unique consciousness. Does not adhere to a higher 
divine being but acts in accordance with his own thoughts. These thoughts along with 
his actions are what create history.1 Status: endangered.  
 The ‘human’ has long been regarded by traditional enlightenment and post-
enlightenment humanism through the statements provided above. It is only now 
through the emergence of posthuman identities that this representation of the ‘human’ 
is becoming endangered and will ultimately disappear. By focusing on Atwood’s two 
novels Oryx and Crake alongside Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl, this 
dissertation will serve to discuss the deconstruction of the human defined by 
traditional liberal humanism and investigate the subsequent, inevitable and 
unalterable move to posthumanism. This will discuss posthuman bodies with their 
own identity and ideologies that ‘reject the assumed universalism and exceptional 
being of Enlightenment humanism and in its place substitute mutation, variation and 
becoming.’2 Through the works of Atwood and Bacigalupi, the endangered status of 
the ‘human’ will also be addressed and it will be argued that it is a result of an 
impending epistemic shift.  
 Posthumanism and posthuman identity can be traced back to the late 1960’s, 
when humanism was ultimately left deflated, most prominently through Nietzsche’s 
abdication of God and his movement into Nihilism, and through Martin Heidegger’s 
anti-humanist work Letter on Humanism. Existence for Heidegger meant ‘ecstatic 
                                                        
1 Myra J Seaman, ‘Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Future’ in 
Journal of Narrative Theory, 37.2 (2007), p. 246. 
2 Seaman, ‘Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Future’, p. 247. 
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involvement in the world, not simply self-consciousness raised to its limit.’3 He 
claimed that being was the source of meaning, contrary to those on the side of 
humanism such as Jean-Paul Sartre whose view of existence was ‘no more than the 
ecstatic but empty separation of consciousness from itself.’4 Heidegger rejects the 
humanist view for which the human is central and declares, ‘“Thus, what matters in 
the determination of the humanity of man as ex-sistence is not that man is the 
essential, but that Being is the essential.’”5 Before this assault on humanism, there 
was no concept that the nonhuman/posthuman could exist as an autonomous, 
ontological entity and there was no room for the human and posthuman to co-exist as 
equal counterparts. Through humanist thought there is an absolute difference between 
the human and the nonhuman and this is that reason belongs solely to the human.6 
 In Discourse on the Method Descartes remarked that reason was the only thing 
that ‘makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts.’7 Descartes essentially stated 
that human beings would forever be able to distinguish the distinction between the 
human and the nonhuman. It was considered unheard of that the 
nonhuman/posthuman could exist as an autonomous, ontological entity with more 
authority than the human. Descartes argued that alongside dialogues, action based on 
understanding would serve to affirm this distinction: 
Even though machines might do some things as well as we do them, or 
perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal 
that they were acting not through understanding but only from the 
disposition of their organs […] hence it is for all practical purposes 
impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make it act in 
all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act.8 
 
                                                        
3 Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other (Illinois: University of Illinois, 2006), p. xix 
4 Levinas, Humanism of the Other, p. xix 
5 Levinas, Humanism of the Other, p. xix 
6 Neil Badmington, (ed), Readers in Cultural Criticism: Posthumanism (London: Palgrave, 2000), p. 4. 
7 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method (Indiana: Hackett, 1998), p. 2 
8 Badmington, Readers in Cultural Criticism: Posthumanism, pp. 3-4. 
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Descartes stated that rational thought and reason belonged solely to the human being 
and rendered it as the singular distinction between the human and the inhuman. At 
these times, God was not deemed as central to knowledge anymore, and the human 
ascended as the central figure of knowledge, conjuring Descartes’ famous phrase ‘I 
think, therefore I am.’9 Neil Badmington, although he does not suggest a precise point 
of origin, argues that the works of Marx and Freud opened a ‘distinct possibility’ into 
the realm of posthumanism. Alongside others such as Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Lacan, their thoughts provided a critical deconstruction of the liberal humanist 
subject. Together, the idea of imagining Marx’s declaration that ‘[social] life […] 
determines consciousness’10 and Freud’s Ego, Superego and Id and the 
unpredictability of consciousness, was more than enough to knock man from his 
position as the central being of the universe and overcome the anthropocentric and 
godly mindset that had taken hold. Furthermore, in the progressive course of 
centuries, Badmington further explains that man was subject to more knocks. He 
recognises that the self-love and glorifying central stage position of ‘man’ was 
wounded when biological research accredited Darwin’s theory of Evolution and 
‘man’ had to come to terms with his own ‘ineradicable animal nature.’11 Then there 
was a further blow when humanity learnt of earth’s position in relation to the rest of 
the cosmic system. Suddenly, man was feeling very small indeed and the liberal 
humanist subject was beginning to crumble. 
 The deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject and its impending 
endangered status is a view supported by Foucault. He was an opponent of the 
traditional humanist stance and supported the idea that for radical change to occur, 
                                                        
9 Badmington, Readers in Cultural Criticism: Posthumanism, p. 3. 
10 Nicholas Churchich, Marxism and Morality: A Critical Examination (Cambridge: James Clarke 
&Co, 1994), p. 57.  
11 Badmington, Readers in Cultural Criticism: Posthumanism, p, 6. 
 4 
then it would warrant the death of man and that already ‘man is in the process of 
disappearing.’12 Foucault’s ideas were arguably more grounded in antihumanism, yet 
they deal with the inescapable shift and change in consciousness from the ‘human’ to 
the ‘posthuman’ not through a change of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ but through a change of 
‘how we know.’13 The shift is not a steady improvement, but more a rapid and 
unpredictable moment where the consciousness develops and changes. The 
epistemological shift that Foucault references is the change in society, civilization and 
culture based on the framework of knowledge in that time. What Foucault calls the 
‘episteme’ is defined as the ‘term for the body of ideas which shape the perception of 
knowledge at a particular period.’14 However, Foucault considered the term as 
encompassing a system ‘governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic, that 
operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects and define a system of 
conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain 
and period.’15An epistemic shift has occurred before between the Enlightenment and 
the Romantic period, which meant there was a noticeable movement from the 
pragmatic, reason-based ideologies of philosophers, where, subject to reason, 
everything was valued on equal merit and that through rationalism, humans could 
improve the world through uncovering truths.16 The move to Romanticism, through 
the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant moved on to question 
whether there could be a determinate portrayal of the world around us, as they 
                                                        
12 Michel Foucault, ‘The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences’ in Readers in 
Cultural Criticism: Posthumanism (London: Palgrave, 2000), p. 27. 
13 http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/WER2.html - Vernor Vinge, ‘The Coming 
Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era’ (Accessed 30th July, 2013) 
14 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/63540?redirectedFrom=episteme#eid  - OED (Accessed 15th 
August, 2013) 
15 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/  -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Accessed 15th 
August, 2013) 
16 http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html (Accessed 15th August, 2013) 
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determined that all structures were subject to change due to the concept of historical 
development.17  
 Through the development of the posthuman condition, it is clear that an 
epistemic shift is occurring again but this time, as Foucault states at the end of The 
Order of Things, ‘man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the 
sea.’18 Foucault suggests that man must be understood as a new invention and is not, 
in current form, the result of an ‘eternal, naturally occurring phenomenon.’19 This 
suggests that through the mutable views and values of knowledge, Foucault was 
speculating in the mid nineteenth century that there would be another epistemic shift.  
He stated that man could disappear altogether if there was another change in the 
fundamental arrangements of knowledge such as which occurred between the 
Enlightenment and Romantic periods. 
 Foucault’s theory resonates particularly powerfully within both Atwood’s and 
Bacigalupi’s novels, which both create a setting where humans are sharing their 
worlds unequally with posthumans and transgenic beings. Yet the emphasis in both 
novels, and arguably the sympathy, lies predominantly with the posthumans and 
genetically modified creatures. After the two near apocalyptic events, the humans left 
alive in the novels result in either mourning the loss of their old ideologies and slowly 
being driven into despair or are accepting of the new ideologies of the posthumans, 
whilst still wanting to maintain dominance over them. At times they are unable to 
accept a being that is better than them both physically and mentally and they seek to 
commodify posthuman beings and hold onto their ‘human’ supremacy by turning the 
posthumans into private property. This highlights the struggle and challenges that 
                                                        
17 http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html (Accessed 15th August, 2013)  
18 Foucault, ‘The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences’, p. 29.  
19 Badmington, Readers in Cultural Criticism: Posthumanism, p. 144.  
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humans face in regard to holding on to their perception of humanity and retaining 
their idea of what it means to be human. This poses the question of whether ‘man’ in 
terms of the liberal humanist subject will slowly disappear, as human beings’ 
ideologies begin to be superseded by the posthumans of the novels. 
 N. Katherine Hayles defines posthumanism through four key points 
articulating that ‘the posthuman subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous 
components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous 
construction and reconstruction.’20 She pronounces that posthuman discourse will not 
only supersede but also do away with the “natural” self.’21 Hayles argues that the 
terror of the posthuman, in particular the use of ‘“post” with its dual connotation of 
superseding the human and coming after it, hints that the days of “the human” may be 
numbered.’22 Hayles herself opposes this view, believing that the human body has a 
‘physical structure whose constraints and possibilities have been formed by an 
evolutionary history that intelligent machines do not share.’23 Hayles’ points take the 
same position that Foucault was trying to express. Instead of arguing that the 
posthuman will attain a position of being superior to the human and ruling them, they 
consider that the liberal humanist subject and their ideologies and arrangements of 
knowledge will vanish or change and that posthumanism does not mean the end of 
humanity as a physical entity. Hayles argues that: 
It signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception 
that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the 
wealth, power and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous 
                                                        
20 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 3 
21 William S Haney, Cyerbculture, Cyborgs and Science Fiction Consciousness and the Posthuman 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 3 
22 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, p. 
283. 
23 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, p. 
284. 
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beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice.24 
 
What appears to be the threat is not the posthuman but the transhumanist notion of 
taking the liberal humanist view of the self and transplanting it onto the posthuman. 
This is what creates the fear people have for posthumanism and transgenic beings. 
Hayles opposes the view of transhumanists who believe that humans can only stay 
alive by becoming machines themselves. Sharon Bell agrees with this opposition, 
agreeing with Hayles about the fear of positing the posthuman onto the liberal human 
self. She states: 
One of the serious flaws in Transhumanism is the importation of liberal-
human values to the biotechno enhancement of the human. Posthumanism 
has a much stronger critical edge attempting to develop through enactment 
new understandings of the self and other, essence, consciousness, 
intelligence, reason, agency, intimacy, life, embodiment, identity and the 
body.25 
 
Transhumanism is used as a social and political stance in order to transform 
humans into beings that can ultimately achieve immortality. Nick Bostrom states 
that a human would want to become posthuman as they have a desire to have a 
greatly enhanced capacity to stay alive and he suspects that ‘the majority of 
humankind already has such a desire implicitly.’26 Yet, transhumanism is still 
importing the liberal human values to the enhancement of the human. There is 
more a drive to become perfect and stay on top through alteration of their bodies. 
 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century there have been instances in 
SF literature where genetic construction and alteration, both on humans and animals, 
highlights the strain between humans, nonhumans and the posthuman. Darko Suvin 
                                                        
24 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, p. 
286. 
25 http://magazine.ciac.ca/archives/no_23/en/entrevue.htm - Shannon Bell Magazine article. (Accessed 
5th August, 2013) 
26 Max More and Natasha Vita-More (eds), The Transhumanist Reader (West Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013), p. 33. 
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argued that for a text to be registered as SF it needs to actively interact with the 
presence of cognition and estrangement and for ‘the central novum […] to be within 
the bounds of scientific reason.’27 The novum within Atwood’s and Bacigalupi’s 
novels are seen as the genetic constructs of the Crakers and New People respectively 
alongside transgenic animals. The novum lies within the bounds of scientific reason 
as genetic experimentation is happening in current times yet does not go as far as the 
novels do due to moral issues and the fear of the ‘other’. Japanese roboticist Doctor 
Masahiro Mori explains through his thesis ‘The Uncanny Valley’ that when someone 
‘sees something that is nearly human, [there is] just enough off-kilter to seem eerie or 
disquieting.’28 Even in the nineteenth century, arguably the very first SF novel, Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, portrays Frankenstein’s monster as a complete outcast, 
othered by how he appears and speaks and as Frankenstein does not give the creature 
a name, he denies it an identity, relegating it to subhuman. Atwood states that if you 
are going to use genetic modification on humans then ‘what you have to ask yourself 
is, do you want the human race to remain human?’29 The deconstruction of the liberal 
humanist self is exemplified in Atwood and Bacigalupi’s novels, through their 
portrayal of posthuman subjects as first being perceived as the ‘other’ but then 
gaining their own agency as autonomous entities, where in the end they are seen to 
prevail.  
 Atwood introduces a post-apocalyptic world defamiliarised through the abuse 
of science and genetic engineering where transgenic animals and posthuman bodies 
become the dominant focus group and the human is marginalised as the minority. 
                                                        
27 http://rationalist.org.uk/437/the-science-of-fiction - Bo Fowler, ‘The Science of Fiction’ (Accessed 
9th August, 2013) 
28 http://www.arclight.net/~pdb/nonfiction/uncanny-valley.html - Moshi Mori, ‘The Uncanny Valley’ 
(Accessed 9th August, 2013) 
29 J. Brooks Bouson (ed.), Margaret Atwood The Robber Bride, The Blind Assassin, Oryx and Crake 
(London: Continuum, 2010), p. 125.  
 9 
Similarly, Bacigalupi envisions a post-apocalyptic world where the world’s food and 
energy sources are becoming dangerously scarce. In the future worldview of 
Thailand, Bacigalupi shows the near exhaustion of humankind’s resource base and 
proposes how this agricultural catastrophe has led to the domination of the consumer 
market by large corporations through genetically modified crops. One of the basic 
needs for the preservation of life is the need to eat. Throughout history ‘a sustainable 
food supply [has always been] a unique, foundational human need’ that exceeds even 
reproduction.30 Tragically, in an economic system where decisions, both political and 
public, are ruled by profit and material prosperity, food has been reduced to being 
classed as merely another commodity.31 This also applies to posthuman bodies in the 
novels, which are claimed as private property and traded as commodities, highlighting 
neo-colonisation, where those in power take what they want. In ‘Writing Oryx and 
Crake,’ Margaret Atwood agrees, as she observes: ‘the rules of biology are as 
inexorable as those of physics: run out of food and water and you die. No animal can 
exhaust its resource base and hope to survive. Human civilisations are subject to the 
same law.’32 The Windup Girl demonstrates how global warming has devastated the 
world. Due to climate change and continual mutations of disease, means of producing 
food was taken away and, during the Expansion phase, the world was left with the 
inability to feed itself. Agricultural corporations then monopolized the food industry 
by delivering artificial food in order to produce mass profit and gain capitalist control. 
 Atwood’s future dystopia also demonstrates a world altered by climate change 
                                                        
30 John Hodges, ‘Globalization and Sustainability in Agriculture: Role of Law and Ethics’ in Jennifer 
Gunning, Soren Holm and Ian Kenway (eds.), Ethics, Law and Society, Volume 4 (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2009), p. 91. 
31 John Hodges, ‘Globalization and Sustainability in Agriculture: Role of Law and Ethics, p. 91. 
32 Margaret Atwood, Moving Targets: Writing with Intent, 1982-2004 (Canada: House of Anansi 
Press, 2004), p. 329.  
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and dominated by corporations. Marcy Galbreath points out that Atwood has created a 
‘world that borrows from contemporary transgenic research and agricultural practices 
to extrapolate a logical and disturbing set of probabilities.’33 This response applies 
perfectly to Bacigalupi’s future as well. It can be argued that ‘the environmental 
impacts of our actions are often hidden or indirect.’34 Both novels have encountered 
ecological disaster but are still perpetuating engagement with consumerism. It is 
normally the rich or the elite in society who gain access and the capability to define 
‘man’s’ image, creating a natural divide in the species. The Western episteme has 
followed a historical trajectory dating from the nineteenth century and fits snugly 
within this formulaic regime. Those in power dictate how people think, and what they 
know and are allowed to know. Nietzsche, in his collection of aphorisms, Human, All 
Too Human, writes that ‘Socrates and Plato are right: whatever man does he always 
does the good, that is to say: that which seems to him good (useful) according to the 
relative degree of his intellect, the measure of his rationality.’35 It is through the 
extent of knowledge and the discourse of such knowledge that men are led to believe 
that what they are doing is the complete and absolute right and just way. In the case of 
Oryx and Crake and The Windup Girl, the outdated, consumer driven mindset of the 
current human race is slowly leading to mass population problems and ecological 
destitution.  
 Even in current society, concerns over genetic modification are rife, as many 
express anxiety that ‘altering genes could lead to unforeseen problems for future 
generations’ and that ‘it is wrong […] food supplies could be controlled by the few 
                                                        
33 Marcy Galbreath, ‘A Consuming Read: the Ethics of Food in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake’ 
in Florida Gulf Coast University’s 2nd International Humanities and Sustainability Conference, Fort 
Myers, Florida, October 7-9, (2010), p.1. 
34 Samantha Clark, ‘Strange strangers and uncanny hammers: Morton's The Ecological Thought and 
the phenomenological tradition’ in Green Letters: Studies in Ecocriticism, 17, 2013, p, 98. 
35 Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche: Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 55. 
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who can afford the development costs.’36 Bacigalupi and Atwood address these 
current issues within their speculative novels as they portray a view where geneticists 
or ‘generippers’ are altering the genome of nearly every living organism available to 
them and although the authors do not overtly reveal it, it can be argued that these 
people are even creating and mutating strains of disease. Therefore, it can be argued 
that several corporations have waged silent wars on each other over control of how 
food will be grown in order to gain power through intellectual property rights and 
high profits. This is a feature of humanism. Shannon Bell argues that: 
Altruism, mutualism, humanism are the soft and slimy virtues that underpin 
liberal capitalism. Humanism has always been integrated into discourses of 
exploitation: colonialism, imperialism, neoimperialism, democracy.37 
 
This quotation describes the exploitation occurring with the humans involved in the 
novels; it is through colonisation and imperialism that corporations are able to take 
control and manipulate. People are altruistic primarily to kin and close friends, they 
do not act as kindly to strangers or people rendered ‘other’. In terms of colonisation 
the two novels can be argued to be ‘neo-colonial’ in that they ‘continue to exploit the 
people in a way not dissimilar to the colonists.’38 Except this time they use genetic 
engineering in order to capitalise.  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
36 Janet Bainbridge (ed), Foods for Our Future: Genetic Modification and Food (London: Food and 
Drink Federation, 2000), p.16. 
37 http://magazine.ciac.ca/archives/no_23/en/entrevue.htm - Shannon Bell Magazine article. (Accessed 
5th August, 2013) 
38 John Mcleod, Beginning Postcolonialism Second Edition (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2010), p. 108. 
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1. 
Neither Good nor Evil: On the epistemic shift from human to posthuman. 
 
 
 
 
The farther backward you can look, the further forward you 
are likely to see.39 
- WINSTON CHURCHILL 
 
ALL Bibles or sacred codes have been the causes of the 
following Errors: […] 2. That Energy, call’d Evil, is alone 
from the Body; & that Reason, call’d Good, is alone from 
the Soul.40 
                                                       - WILLIAM BLAKE 
 
 
 
Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake is a dystopic and satirical work of fiction, 
focusing on the aftermath of a biotechnological apocalypse. Coral Ann Howell points 
out that “‘many dystopias are self-consciously warnings. A warning implies that 
chance, and therefore hope, are still possible.”’41 In the terms of ecological 
destitution, this novel would serve as a warning to look after the environment. Many 
eco-critics such as Timothy Morton believe that Atwood and Bacigalupi are 
presenting a view on what will happen when man begins to interfere with nature and 
morality in the quest for immortality and the detrimental effects it can have on nature 
and humanity. However, considering the epistemic shift registers change as being 
unpredictable, rapid and unstable, the novel acts less as a warning and more as an 
inevitable outcome of progression regardless of hope or chance. 
 The change from human to posthuman can be considered an epistemic shift as 
there are several instances that articulate how the posthuman has replaced the 
                                                        
39 John P. Smol, Pollution of Lakes and Rivers: A Paleoenvironmental Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2008), p. 12. 
40 William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 16. 
41Coral Ann Howells (ed), ‘Margaret Atwood’s dystopian visions: The Handmaid’s Tale and Oryx and 
Crake’ in The Cambridge Companion to Margaret Atwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 161.  
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nineteenth century’s idea of ‘man’ and his surrounding knowledge. This shift involves 
the consciousness of posthumans and Crake states the difference between the 
nineteenth century concept of ‘man’ and his own children of Crake: 
Racism […] had been eliminated. […] Hierarchy could not exist amongst 
them […] there was no territoriality: the king-of-the-castle hard-wiring that 
had plagued humanity had, in them, been unwired. […] There would be no 
family trees, no marriages, no divorces […] perfectly adjusted to their 
habitat […] They would have no need to invent any harmful symbolisms, 
such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money. Best of all they recycled their own 
excrement.42  
 
Crake also tells Jimmy that:  
It no longer matters who the father of the inevitable child may be, since 
there’s no more property to inherit, no father–son loyalty required for war. 
Sex is no longer a mysterious rite, viewed with ambivalence or downright 
loathing, conducted in the dark and inspiring suicides and murders. (p. 195) 
 
Crake carries on with this idea, telling Jimmy, ‘“how much needless despair has been 
caused by a series of biological mismatches […] resulting in the fact that the one you 
love so passionately won’t or can’t love you”’ (p. 195) and argues that pair-bonding 
for life or ‘total guilt-free promiscuity’ (p. 195) would solve all problems and end 
sexual torment.  Jimmy objects to this idea, telling Crake that ‘“we’d just be a bunch 
of hormone robots […] There’d be no free choice”’ (p. 196). After Crake confirms 
that he does believe that humans are merely faulty hormone robots, Jimmy becomes 
antagonised and almost in desperation asks Crake, ‘“What about art?’” arguing 
‘“When any civilization is dust and ashes […] art is all that’s left over. Images, 
words, music. Imaginative structures. Meaning – human meaning, that is – is defined 
by them”’ (p. 196). Jimmy holds on to language, signs and signifiers, which become 
                                                        
42 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (London: Virago, 2009), pp. 358-359. All further references will 
be given in the body of the text.  
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the main apparent difference between himself and Crake’s posthuman creation: the 
Crakers. 
 Jimmy, defined as Snowman in the post-apocalyptic world, has not undergone 
transformation alongside the epistemic shift. He still retains his perception of 
humanity and humanism as he clings to the ideologies of a nineteenth century man 
which privileges humanism as the natural state of being. He is an outsider in the new 
world, a hideous figure, an ‘other’, that the Crakers neither distrust nor revere (until 
the potential hint of religion towards the end of the novel). He defines himself as ‘the 
abominable snowman – existing and not existing’ (p. 8). He is a liminal character that 
exists in the new posthuman world but he is not a creature of the new posthuman 
ideology and thus he is relegated to the category of the ‘other’. Snowman’s self, 
which was once believed to be centre of the universe from a humanist perspective, has 
now been transferred to existing as the minority. The posthuman Crakers have 
developed a consciousness without the concepts in knowledge of what the liberal 
humanist view of the self had visualized therefore they do not alienate Snowman in 
the same way that the ‘other’ has been categorised through prejudice, fear and 
ownership throughout history. They accept Snowman’s monstrousness as ‘they’ve 
known from the beginning he was a separate order of being’ (p. 116). Snowman exists 
as the minority as he believes he is the only ‘human’ left on the planet. He aches to 
tell the Crakers that ‘I’m your past. I’m your ancestor, come from the land of the 
dead. Now I’m lost, I can’t get back, I’m stranded here, I’m all alone. Let me in!’ (p. 
123). He accepts that his past human existence has vanished; yet he is still unable to 
fully let go of his human essence.  
 Atwood alludes to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein but inverts the original 
scientist/monster paradigm as she has developed a world where the creation is not 
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seen as the monster anymore.43 The Crakers are ‘normal’ in the post-apocalyptic 
world, and although Snowman is not their creator, he is an artifact from Crake’s 
world and it is he, Snowman, that is seen as the monstrosity; the unknown, grotesque 
and ‘other’. Snowman is marginalised and ‘othered’ through his use of language and 
the relentless need to hold onto it. In the way that Frankenstein’s monster tries 
desperately to adapt to the society into which he has been thrown, Snowman 
contrastingly cannot let go of his old ideologies. Chung-Hao Ku emphasises this point 
in her essay as she argues that it is the death of language and its defunct use which 
makes ‘word man’ Snowman unable to relate to anybody else. Ku also states that: ‘it 
is the Frankenstein-Monster double that haunts and fascinates the public most. People 
tend to mistake Frankenstein for the Monster, and this “conflation,” according to 
Chris Hables Gray, “signifies that the doctor actually is monstrous in our minds.”’44 
The doctor is more relatable to Crake, yet as Snowman killed him, he is the last – he 
assumes – survivor of an old world and he never really tried to stop Crake in his 
creation of the Crakers, so partly he is to blame and thus accentuates his position as 
the monster. 
 The Crakers regard Snowman as something familiar, despite his unfamiliarity 
to themselves, and do not care for the differences they both have, yet Snowman is left 
being painfully aware of the distinction between them: ‘There’s a distant, peaceful 
murmur from the village: human voices. If you can call them human’ (p. 122). 
Snowman attempts to try and make them relatable and signify them to himself but 
always fails at the final hurdle. Even though they were created from alterations to the 
‘ancient primate brain’ (p. 359), the physical and mental attributions of the Crakers 
                                                        
43 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
44 Chung-Hao Ku, ‘Of Monster and Man: Transgenics and Transgression in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx 
and Crake’ in Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies, 32 (2006), p.108. 
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are very far removed from the original template of man. Their skin smells of lemons 
to ward off mosquitoes; they produce ‘special piss’ (p. 183) allocated only to men, 
which creates a protective boundary around them and wards off predators; they have 
an incredibly fast pubescent growth period and are able to heal through purring. Apart 
from these physical attributes, the Crakers’ mental abilities are also changed as they 
are unable to think abstractly, contemplate intangible creations and understand jokes 
or art as Crake says: ‘“For jokes you need a certain edge, a little malice’” (p. 359). 
There are no jokes anymore and the fundamentals of language are beginning to break 
down. Mary Galbreath states that the Crakers are ‘the ultimate eugenics experiment, 
the Crakers embody an anti-humanist rationale, with survival, not culture, 
their dominant trait.’45 This suggests that it is not the posthumans that are a threat, as 
stated by Hayles earlier. The Crakers can be seen as a metaphor for change and 
highlight the deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject by prioritising survival 
over culture.  
 Snowman constantly asks himself why he is so bereft and feeling dejected all 
the time. He questions whether it is ‘because he doesn’t understand this kind of 
behavior? Because it’s beyond him? Because he can’t jump in?’ (p. 199). The world 
Snowman belonged to has slipped away and he has remained where he does not fit in 
and is slowly being driven to despair. His otherness is highlighted through the fact 
that ‘he feels excluded, as if from a party to which he will never be invited’ (p. 123). 
Ernst Cassirer argued against Heidegger’s Letters on Humanism summarising that 
‘humanity […] cannot be divorced from the essential idealism that lies in the 
objective or transpersonal character of its symbolic world as such, whether mystic, 
                                                        
45 http://www.academia.edu/238034/Genomic_Bodies_Un-
Natural_Selection_Extinction_and_the_Posthuman_in_Atwoods_Oryx_and_Crake  - Mary Galbreath, 
‘Genomic Bodies: Un-Natural Selection, Extinction and the Posthuman in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake’ 
(Accessed 20th August, 2013) 
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artistic, linguistic, religious or scientific.’46 Complying with Cassirer’s beliefs, 
Snowman understands that he can never belong to the same world as the Crakers as 
they have a completely different set of ideologies and beliefs. This understanding also 
shows through the way in which Snowman tries desperately to maintain his grasp on 
his old world through his struggle with the remembrance of words and language, his 
human rituals and attempt at time keeping. It is also apparent in the way he hoards 
material items that are now defunct in the new environment: ‘He keeps a can opener 
there too, and for no particular reason an ice pick; and six empty beer bottles, for 
sentimental reasons’ (p. 4).  It can be seen that Snowman is marginalising himself, as 
he simply cannot let go of his humanity and is unable to divorce himself from the 
symbolic essences of his lost ideals. In regards to food, he states ‘they’re protein, but 
they’re not enough for him. Not enough calories. […] Time to face reality. […] He’s 
slowly starving to death’ (p. 175). Snowman is slowly fading away along with the old 
human world. Not only is he mentally losing a grasp on his humanist self, he is also 
physically being removed from the world through his starvation and his slowly 
decaying foot, which shows again a bleak outlook for mankind.  
 However, it can be argued that Snowman does slowly start to shake off the 
layers of nineteenth century thought and feeling and begins to deconstruct his own 
liberal humanist self. He begins to act more animal-like in direct comparison to the 
more human-like animals that emerged due to genetic experimentation. He begins to 
opt for survival, not culture. Snowman denounces the need for underpants and shoes. 
Where there is footwear available, he argues with himself that ‘he can no longer stand 
the thought of footwear’ and there are stacks of underpants, yet he asks himself ‘why 
did he used to wear such garments?’ (p. 393).  Offred in Atwood’s first speculative 
                                                        
46 Levinas, Humanism of the Other, p. xxv. 
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piece of fiction, The Handmaid’s Tale, is similar in this instance in that through her 
displacement from having equal human rights to being kept for ‘breeding purposes’47 
in her role as a handmaiden, she begins asking herself questions such as: ‘Did I really 
wear bathing suits, at the beach?’ (p. 72). Instead of taking on animal like qualities, 
Offred encounters cultural change and difference, stating that now in her current 
condition, she would be classed as ‘shameful, immodest’ (p. 72) but it is the same 
distancing move away from nineteenth century values. Clothes replace the body as the 
signifier of humanity, rather than the self, and the moral and social attitudes aligned to 
them. This corresponds to the ethnography of clothing as both Snowman and Offred 
have altered views on clothing now that they have been situated into new cultural 
conditions with different customs. Snowman also begins to question the use of 
retaining obsolete material items from the past, signifiers of a different time. He asks 
‘why hoard the stuff? Why wait? […] He’s served his evolutionary purpose’ (p. 125). 
He begins to realise that he longer has need for items, which belonged to a past era, a 
different ideology.  
 In addition to his abdication of material items, Snowman’s own language and 
discourse begins to deteriorate as he is left clutching for words or meanings he once 
knew but which are now slowly leaking out of him along with the 19th century 
conception of man and art: 
From nowhere, a word appears: Mesozoic. He can see the word, he can hear 
the word, but he can’t reach the word. He can’t attach anything to it. This is 
happening too much lately, this dissolution of meaning, the entries on his 
cherished wordlists drifting off into space. (p. 43) 
 
In his past, Jimmy was known as the ‘word person’ whereas Crake belonged strictly 
to the sciences. Jimmy embodied art, creativity and irrational thought, yet after the 
                                                        
47 Margaret, Atwood The Handmaid’s Tale (London: Virago, 2007), p. 146. All further references will 
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apocalyptic wipe out of human existence, Jimmy/Snowman starts to lose his bearing 
within the world of art, especially through language: ‘“When they’re gone out of his 
head, these words, they’ll be gone, everywhere, forever. As if they had never been”’ 
(p. 78). Snowman aches to be able ‘to read, to view, to hear, to compile’ (p. 175) but 
he never has the chance. This is similar to Offred, whose story exemplifies a 
regressive epistemic shift in consciousness. In the way that Jimmy/Snowman slowly 
loses his grasp of language, Offred has the opportunity to explore language taken 
away from her as she says that she ‘can be read to […] but cannot read’ (p. 98) and it 
is considered a taboo and punishable act for her to be allowed to read. The act of 
reading is interesting in Snowman’s case as he is in his own last-man narrative 
without anybody else to leave his story to. He calls himself a castaway but then 
laments on that idea: ‘Even a castaway assumes a future reader. […] Snowman can 
make no such assumptions: he’ll have no future reader, because the Crakers can’t 
read. Any reader he can possibly imagine is in the past’ (p. 46). In Snowman’s mind, 
language will meet its end with him. 
 Both characters lose their grasp on language and this highlights the centrality 
of language as the problem of the human. ‘Man’ is characterised by what he knows 
and how he expresses such knowledge, thus Snowman’s slow loss of words shows his 
shedding of humanity and the deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject. The 
death of ‘man’ and the movement to posthuman is emphasised by the fact that the 
Crakers do not need written language. This is different with Offred, as the language 
restrictions emphasise her subjugation by the male populace of the novel and the 
backwards episteme in which she is trapped. Hilde Staels argues that ‘we construct 
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and project a version of self and identity through the language we use.’48 Snowman is 
clearly at a loss with his own self and human identity as he is struggling to 
comprehend the new world and where he fits in. He is confused and mourns his past 
life, wishing for something to read and constantly having ‘rag ends of language […] 
floating in his head’ (p. 175). Snowman shouts out loud that he used to be ‘erudite’ (p. 
175). Erudite meant to show great knowledge or learning, yet now in this new world 
the word erudite is relegated to ‘a hopeless word’ (p. 175).  Snowman is in a state of 
grief for ‘all those things he once thought he knew’ and is constantly wondering 
‘where have they gone?’ (p. 175). Through his use of the word erudite to symbolise 
himself, Snowman is effectively regarding himself as ‘hopeless’ and projecting the 
hopelessness of the future of language and therefore, of mankind also.49 
  Interestingly, the last believed human being, Snowman, is seen through a 
series of flashbacks as the young Jimmy, a boy who is constantly undermined 
throughout the novel. His parents ignore him; he never matches up to the ideals of the 
CorpSeCorps guards; both Oryx and Crake undervalue him and use him for their own 
means and he deems himself, on more than one occasion, to be insignificant and 
worthless. He tells himself that if he had been from a Module school or ‘“the public 
system”’ then he would have ‘shone like a diamond in a drain’ (p. 204). But 
compared to the Compound school which were inundated with brilliant genes, 
Jimmy’s ‘talents shrank by comparison’ (p. 204). Yet, when he becomes Snowman, 
Jimmy shouts out loud: ‘“I am not my childhood’” (p. 68). He refuses to be how he 
was before and therefore refuses to be treated or regard himself as the victimised and 
lonely boy he once was. Not only is Jimmy victimised and bullied constantly by both 
                                                        
48 Gina Wisker, Margaret Atwood: An Introduction to Critical Views of her Fiction (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 9.  
49 http://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/001/457/834/RUG01-001457834_2011_0001_AC.pdf - Tom Van 
Steendam, ‘Paratextuality and Parody in a Post-cataclysmic Wasteland: Margaret Atwood‘s Oryx and 
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Oryx and Crake but he also seems to be an outcast within his own narrative. 
Snowman chooses the name ‘Abominable Snowman’ to ‘other’ himself but it also 
hints at something monstrous and feared. Yet, as the novel progresses, Snowman 
begins to think: 
Maybe he’s not the Abominable Snowman after all. Maybe he’s the other 
kind of snowman, the grinning dope set up as a joke […] his pebble smile 
and carrot nose an invitation to mockery and abuse. Maybe that’s the real 
him, the last Homo sapiens – a white illusion of a man, here today, gone 
tomorrow, so easily shoved over, left to melt in the sun, getting thinner and 
thinner until he liquefies and trickles away altogether. (p. 263) 
 
This paragraph dually exposes Snowman’s childhood as a victim of mockery and 
abuse and the loss he feels for the liberal humanist self, who once believed itself 
superior to any other species but is now ‘so easily shoved over’ (p. 263). Snowman 
consistently tells his story in the third person and Coral Ann Howells suggests that 
this directly parallels Jimmy’s displacement in the posthuman world, as he is no 
longer the central figure physically or metaphysically.50  
 Timelessness also plays a large part in Jimmy’s loss of centrality as the 
dominant species. From the beginning of the novel, Snowman is afraid of looking at 
his watch and noticing that it is ‘zero hour’ and that ‘nobody nowhere knows what 
time it is’ (p. 3). Snowman is left being unable to keep track of time or dates any 
longer: ‘At that time he’d had a knife, but he lost it a week later, or was it two weeks? 
He must keep better track of such things as weeks’ (p. 42). Through the use of ‘such 
things’, Atwood is already showing the effect of the epistemic shift within the novel, 
as time is not recorded in the same way as before the apocalyptic virus broke out. The 
use of the word ‘week’ is no longer regarded as an abstract noun relatable to and is 
instead relegated to a ‘thing’. Snowman grumbles at himself: 
                                                        
50 Wisker, Margaret Atwood: An Introduction to Critical Views of her Fiction, p. 155. 
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He has to find more and better ways of occupying his time. His time, what a 
bankrupt idea, as if he’s been given a box of time belonging to him alone, 
stuffed to the brim with hours and minutes that he can spend like money. 
Trouble is, the box has holes in it and the time is running out, no matter what 
he does with it. (p. 44) 
 
There is no concept of time anymore, merely an ongoing progression that has left 
behind humanism, humanist thought and the humanist subject. Time for Snowman is 
running out and the final sentence of the novel reverts back to this as Snowman is left 
thinking, ‘Zero hour, […] Time to go’ (p. 433). This essentially poses a directive for 
all of mankind as well and it is possible that through the symbolism of Snowman, it is 
time for all mankind to go. 
 The epistemic shift from human to posthuman can also be seen in Bacigalupi’s 
novel The Windup Girl, another text which takes place in a future world and, which 
having already suffered through a global warming crisis, is at threat from total 
ecological disaster and ruin. The loss of nature and essentially humanity within the 
novel is an outcome from having too much control over it. Everything in Bacigalupi’s 
world is basically genetically engineered. Despite the apparent contrast in terms of 
resources this setting is strikingly similar to Atwood’s genetically manipulated world. 
There is a massive extinction of species, which occurs through the novel due to 
genetically modified disease and ecological decline. This ecological destitution – 
especially towards the end of the novel – highlights the end of moral ethics 
surrounding anthropocentricism and instead creates the new issue of ‘the 
reconstruction of social structures and norms.’51 The conventional image of the 
‘human being’ is dissolving, as all the characters ‘appear caught in a space between a 
disintegrating paradigm and a still amorphous paradigm yet to emerge in its place.’52 
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The deconstruction of the liberal humanist view of the self can be seen through the 
representations of the genetic reject windup Emiko and the scientist Gibbons or Gi Bu 
Sen. Andrew Hageman notices how Bacgalupi attempts to deconstruct the liberal 
humanist subject within the novel. To illustrate, Francis Fukuyama’s Our Posthuman 
Future, states that ‘human biotechnology differs substantially from agricultural 
biotechnology insofar as it raises a host of ethical questions related to human dignity 
and human rights that are not an issue for GMOs.’53 Hageman notices how Fukuyama 
preserves the idea of liberal humanist ‘human being’; the centrality of the human 
being and the hierarchal ordering that situates them above nonhumans and nature. 
Hageman states that:  
The Windup Girl illustrates all too horrifically that the borders policed by 
Fukuyama and the ideological position he represents were only ever 
virtually erected. Even for those who would insist on clinging to the 
separation of the “human being” from other beings, this novel exemplifies 
the interconnectedness of all beings through disease and death.54 
 
Bacigalpui portrays this interconnectedness by insisting that everyone is equal on a 
spiritual level, after death, when there is no claim to power anymore. Somchai, a 
minor character in the novel, tells the fighting tiger Jaidee: ‘We’re so few in 
comparison to the past, where did all the souls go? Maybe to the Japanese? Maybe 
into windups?’55 Jaidee masks his uneasiness at Somchai’s words highlighting the 
borders between human and inhuman and his ideological position that anything 
genetically engineered is beneath him, unnatural and inhuman as ‘no soul fills them’ 
and they have no religion (p. 248).  
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 In the same way, the Crakers in Oryx and Crake are by instruction from Crake 
to Jimmy, not to be introduced to any sort of religion and Crake even proclaims that 
they do not have the mental ability to comprehend religion. Similarly, Gibbons in The 
Windup Girl tells Kanya that ‘we all know windups have no souls […] They will have 
to find their own gods to protect them. Their own gods to pray for their dead’ (p. 
345). The windups or New People do not have the same ideologies as a nineteenth 
century ‘man’ and the concept of religion does not seem important nor needed for the 
world in which the windups live. Interestingly, it is the religious communities of the 
liberal humanist subject that condemn Emiko: 
Certainly not the devils that the Grahamites warn against at their pulpits, or 
the soulless creatures imagined out of hell that the forest monk Buddhists 
claim; not a creature unable to ever achieve a soul or a place in the cycles of 
rebirth and striving for Nirvana. Not the affront to the Q’ran that the Green 
Headbands believe. (p. 50)  
Emiko presents a situation where she is the maligned ‘other’ and inverts the reception 
that Snowman received from the Crakers. He understands that they know he is 
different from them but they do not judge him or act negatively towards him whereas 
Emiko is still the paradigm for rejection of the ‘other’. Hageman carries on to state 
readers should ‘identify with Emiko and her plight by relinquishing a rigid notion of 
the “human being” and cultivating hospitality to her as a being who is “new” only 
from a position invested in preserving the conventional liberal-humanist subject.’56 It 
is only by deconstructing the liberal humanist subject that one can understand and 
accept Emiko in her own right as an autonomous equal being. Through the use of 
Gibbons, it is clear to see he does accept Emiko as a posthuman body but adopts a 
transhumanist approach, advocating genetic improvement but still embodying a 
liberal humanist mindset.  
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 Gibbons tells Emiko that perhaps he ‘will be that one’, a god, which the 
windups can follow and revere (p. 345). The human still seems to strive to reconstruct 
nineteenth century social structures and elevate himself to a more powerful position 
within that society. Similar to the Crakers who build an effigy of Snowman and 
mumble his name, almost trying to summon him back once he has left for Paradice, 
Snowman is reminded of what Crake used to say: ‘Symbolic thinking of any kind 
would signal downfall […] Next they’d be inventing idols, and funerals, and grave 
goods, and the after-life, and sin, and Linear B, and kings, and then slavery and war’ 
(p. 420). And even though Snowman does not implicitly act as the Crakers ‘god’, he 
does tell them abstract stories in which both Oryx and Crake are revered as creators. 
Foucault mentioned that the idea that discourse can be described not as a sign of what 
is known but as a condition for knowledge, emphasises that what we actually know 
depends on how we phrase it.57 The way in which Gibbons and Snowman talk about 
gods and creators highlights that they still exist in a mental framework of admiring 
and emulating a transcendent higher power that they will never fully understand. This 
is evident also in Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale where Atwood shows that change 
in context affect our attitudes and behaviours as the character Offred repeatedly 
mentions throughout the novel that ‘context is all’ (p. 144, 192). Gibbons precedes 
this sentiment about becoming New People’s god by telling Kanya that: 
“Everyone dies. […] But you die now because you cling to the past. We 
should all be windups by now. It’s easier to build a person impervious to 
blister rust than to protect an earlier version of the human creature. […] you 
people refuse to adapt. You cling to some idea of humanity that evolved in 
concert with your environment over millennia, and which you now, 
perversely, refuse to remain in lockstep with. […] If we wish to remain at 
the top of the food chain, we will evolve. […] Evolve or die […] and yet you 
white shirts seek to stand in the way of inevitable change. If you would just 
let me, I could be your god.” (p. 345) 
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Through this statement, Gibbons is effectively taking on the role of god regarding 
genetic experimentation in exactly the same way that Crake abuses his own power 
and takes on a god-like role. Both of these men want to create posthumans or better 
humans and believe that there is no room left for humans in their current state. This 
shows that humans are seriously under threat, not from their posthuman counterparts, 
but from themselves as they are leading themselves to their deaths. As Gibbons points 
out, in order to stay at the top of the food chain ‘we will evolve.’ Yet this sentence in 
particular is consistent with the episteme in which nineteenth century thought would 
fall into; it is the mindset of an anthropocentric ideology to stay at the top as the 
ultimate being. Gibbons is still constrained by his own humanity, and is hypocritical 
as he argues for Kanya to let go of her humanity and embrace being posthuman. 
Towards the end of the novel Emiko meets Gibbons and she tells him ‘I hate your 
kind’ (p. 504). He replies with ‘you’re as close as anyone ever comes to meeting God. 
Come now, don’t you have any questions for God’ (p. 504). Emiko returns with ‘If 
you were my God, you would have made New People first’ (p. 504). Emiko does not 
idolise Gibbons. Emiko states that if New People had been made first then her people 
‘would have beaten you. Just like the cheshires’ (p. 505). Gibbons smiles at this and 
says ‘Someday, perhaps, all people will be New People and you will look back on us 
as we now look back at the poor Neanderthals’ (p. 505). Hageman states that: 
‘Bacigalupi has created a future populated by posthuman beings whose subjectivity 
undermines the ontological stability of “human beings” in the novel.’58 Human beings 
believe the posthumans are a threat but ultimately they are the threat to themselves.  
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 Both Bacigalupi and Atwood have deconstructed the liberal humanist view of 
the self by introducing posthuman bodies that represent neither an ‘evil’ threat to 
human beings nor are presented as an inherent ‘good’. Instead they both use the 
posthuman identity to criticise the liberal humanist subject and portray human beings 
as a threat to themselves. They display characters who, once removed from their 
position as the central figure within the narrative, have their world crumble into 
despair whilst others are highlighted as persistently acting as though they are in 
control, even when they are not.  
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2.  
The Reprogrammable Human. 
 
 
2.1  
The blurring of boundaries between humans and animals. 
 
 
How much is too much, how far is too far?59 
                                           - ORYX AND CRAKE 
 
 
 
Human beings have always had a complex relationship with animals.60 They have 
been used as objects by which to define human identity, with humans naturally 
discerning them as the ‘other’ and consistently finding ways in which they can 
differentiate themselves. Many have tried to fathom and define the animal-human 
relationship, yet philosophers ranging from Aristotle to Descartes generally perceive 
the animal to be devoid of rational thought and behaving as a machine-like entity. 
Although, according to bioethicist Peter Singer, animals are viewed ‘as beings of no 
ethical significance, or at best, of very minor significance’61 and critiques what he 
calls the speciesism of human beings – the unjust favouring of our species over 
others.62  Yet, in the last fifty years, advancement in medicine, cloning and genetic 
experimentation have unsettled previous conceptions of human identity. In 2005, 
scientists endowed living mice with functioning human cells in their brains.63 Such 
research was regulated and therefore a new legislation led to the prohibition of the 
creation of a chimera, defined by the National Geographic as a human-animal hybrid. 
The experiment garnered much controversy and criticism with many fearing it as a 
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‘slippery slope.’64 Interestingly, the term ‘slippery slope’ is one that Atwood uses 
herself when she asks the reader ‘what if we continue down the road we’re on. How 
slippery is the slope?’65 The balance between humans and animals has generally been 
placed within a binary opposition, yet many thinkers have opposed this view, stating 
that humans are actually equal with animals. Most prominent is Jacques Derrida in his 
work The Animal, Therefore I Am. Derrida argues for how so much heterogeneity can 
be labelled under one umbrella term: the animal. And further he critiques the notion 
that the human cannot fully identify and define itself, yet it can define what it is not: 
an animal. So, what will happen to the status of the human once the boundaries 
between animals and humans begins to blur? Atwood and Bacigalupi serve to blur, if 
not completely abolish, the boundaries between human and animal as the transgenic 
animals in the novels begin to develop human characteristics and humans begin to 
regress to bestial traits.  
  Transgenic animals were introduced in Oryx and Crake as ‘an after-hours 
hobby on the part of one of the OrganInc biolabs hotshots’ (p. 57). This is uncannily 
close to how the cheshires were created as a ‘party favour’ (p. 38) in The Windup 
Girl; they are both made on a whim by humans and it was determined by all scientists 
that ‘create-an-animal was so much fun’ (p. 57). Legislation surrounding moral ethics 
has long been thrown out the window in the two dystopic works as genetic 
experimentation is regarded as the norm due to either corporate rule and devastation 
or catastrophic ecological disaster. Onus is taken off the moral ethics as humans turn 
to genetics in order to create new commodities for business ventures but scarily, it is 
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frequently being used more to merely have fun and pass time. Atwood does show how 
the geneticists did exterminate experiments they deemed, on the surface, dangerous: 
‘who needed a cane toad with a prehensile tail like a chameleon’s that might climb in 
through the bathroom window and blind you while you were brushing your teeth’ (p. 
57). The geneticists believed themselves as gods, able to determine an animal’s life 
and worth and tried, unsuccessfully, to determine the hybrid’s threat to themselves. 
This is evident through the animals that were created merely as a control, for instance, 
bobkittens. Their sole purpose, and reason for construction, was to kill feral cats in 
order to increase the songbird population. Worryingly, the control the geneticists had 
created soon began in turn to get out of control: ‘Small dogs went missing from 
backyards, babies from prams; short joggers were mauled’ (p. 193). Due to the 
bobkittens deriving from genetic experimentation, there was no background history 
on them. The scientists lacked the level of knowledge over them in regard to their 
breeding and intelligence levels, which is exactly what occurs with the cheshires in 
Bacigalupi’s novel.  
 The cheshires are a genetically engineered cat, first designed as a birthday 
present at a child’s party and Bacigalupi highlights the tension building between the 
human and the animal as he demonstrates the overflowing hate humans hold for the 
cheshires. Emiko, the posthuman, on the other hand is surprised to hear that they are 
hated: ‘“You like cheshires?” Anderson asks. Emiko looks at him in surprise. “You 
do not?’” (p. 164). Lake replies with the answer ‘“Back home, we can’t kill them fast 
enough’” (p. 164). Lake displays features of the ideologies of a nineteenth century 
man and liberal humanist subject. He fears anything he suspects as a threat to him, 
and on a larger scale, that is a possible threat to mankind. He mentions that ‘even the 
Grahamites offer blue bills for their skins’ (p. 164). This shows that even so-called 
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peaceful tribes of men who focus on ‘niche and nature’ (p. 165) want the cheshires 
dead and find their uncontrollable breeding rate and the fact they can potentially 
outnumber mankind as an immediate threat to the human race. The blurring of 
human-animal boundaries becomes apparent, as man no longer has control over the 
animal. They can hunt them, and attempt to keep numbers down, but in the end they 
cannot control them. This presents a scary and unknown situation for man but is seen 
only as a threat to their need to be in control.  
 Again, it is only Emiko and the geneticist Gibbons who possess an empathy 
with the cheshires and claim to understand the creatures and believe that they are 
nothing to fear. Towards the end of the novel, Emiko does not seem to notice or care 
when a cheshire appears and muses that it is because ‘she and it are siblings. 
Sympathetic creatures, manufactured by the same flawed gods’ (p. 346). Cynically, 
Emiko describes the ‘gods’ who were perceived as omnipotent and omniscient as 
‘flawed’, emphasising her negative thoughts towards human ideologies. Emiko 
thoughtfully states that ‘they are too much improved for this world’ (p. 164). The fact 
that Emiko has the empathy to side with not only a transgenic creature but also an 
animal shows that she is removed from the anthropocentric mindset of the nineteenth 
century. The boundary between the posthuman and animals has never been 
established as Emiko regards the cheshire as a sibling, created by the same ‘god’. 
Gibbons on the other hand still embodies nineteenth century ideologies, as his 
thoughts regarding the cheshires still remain hierarchal, even though he does not fear 
them:  
I know everything about these felines here. If I cared enough, I might even 
be able to drop a genetic bomb in them that would strip away their 
camouflage and over the course of generations turn them back into their less 
successful version. (p. 504) 
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Due to the use of the words ‘cared enough’, Gibbons is showing that animals are still 
beneath him and is highlighting the control he has over their livelihood. After the 
cheshires, the geneticists soon realised their mistake was allowing reproduction to 
occur as the breeding rate was ridiculously fast. Thus, Emiko also laments the fact 
that ‘if they had made New People first’ she would no longer be a ‘genetic dead end’ 
(p. 164). As she voices these concerns, Lake considers it would have been 
catastrophic for humans if New People were created first as he believes that if she 
were able to reproduce then ‘Emiko might have had the opportunity to supplant the 
human species entirely with her own improved version’ (p. 164). Therefore 
Bacigalupi is demonstrating that the posthuman entities and the transgenic animals are 
still something which the human deems they should have dominance over and be able 
to control. The liberal humanist subject sees the posthuman only as an improved 
version of themselves, something to both fear and admire with an underlying need to 
control it.  
 Lack of control and fear of the unknown by the liberal humanist subject 
highlights the anthropocentric hierarchy and binary opposition between humans and 
animals. Regarding killing a cheshire, Jaidee states ‘it carries no karmic cost. They 
have no soul’ (p. 247). Yet, a minor character in the novel, Somchai, one of Jaidee’s 
trusted and loyal men urges Jaidee not to kill the cheshires stating ‘they bleed like any 
other animal’ (p. 247). He mentions that he has ‘killed six men in my life and never 
regretted any of them, but I’ve killed thousands of cheshires and have never felt at 
ease’ (p. 248). Donna Haraway in ‘Becoming-with-companions’ states that: 
Every other living being except Man can be killed, but not murdered. To 
make merely killable is the height of moral outrage, indeed, it is the 
definition of genocide. Reaction is for and toward the unfree; response is for 
and toward the open. Everything but Man lives in the realm of reaction and 
so calculation – so much animal pain, so much human good, add it up, kill 
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so many animals, call it sacrifice. Do the same for people, and they lose 
their humanity.66 
 
Somchai feels empathy towards the creatures, yet Jaidee merely comes to the 
realisation that the reign of the cheshires will never cease. In the end Jaidee puts his 
gun away, musing that it would be a waste of ammunition as ‘there are always more’ 
(p. 248). The fact that Jaidee, a man of high standing and power, immediately 
relegates anything different from him as having no soul shows his resistance to 
changing ideologies and his religious roots. He believes that anything he himself 
decides does not possess a soul is then fair game to be killed and it is for the greater 
good. As Haraway stated, Jaidee is of the consciousness of ‘man’ in which animals 
can only be killed or sacrificed. Though, further on in the novel, as Jaidee is coming 
to face Akkarat and meet his untimely death, he starts to tell Somchai about what will 
happen if they die there and Somchai interrupts with, ‘then you will come back as a 
cheshire’ (p. 254). Partly, due to Jaidee calling himself the ‘tiger’ and it ‘always being 
in his nature’ (p. 254) to act like one, Somchai is also reiterating his point that a good 
‘human’ soul can be reborn within a posthuman, genetically modified creature. 
 Another who does not believe the chesires are inherently evil is Hock Seng, a 
Chinese immigrant, who is considered inferior in Thailand’s society. He calls the 
cheshires ‘devil cats’ (p. 37) but admits that he has a ‘measure of respect’ (p. 37) for 
them. He is in awe at how they can thrive in places, even when they are despised: 
‘The Green Headbands in Malaya hated the Chinese and the cheshires equally, but as 
far as Hock Seng knows, the devil cats still thrive there’ (p. 38). Hock Seng is as 
equally hated as the transgenic animals, yet he is unable to thrive in a world where he 
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is despised. He admires the cleverness of the cheshires. 
 Unfortunately, in the case of Emiko and other windups, she is forced to submit 
to a degrading imperialistic, misogynistic and patriarchal rule, as when creating her, 
geneticists had ‘learned’ from their mistakes, and made her people infertile and 
submissive to all humans as she is as ‘servile as a dog (p. 262). In Kyoto, Japan, 
Emiko reminisces that windups ‘were sometimes well-respected. Not human, 
certainly, but also not the threat that the people of this savage basic culture make her 
out to be’ (p. 50). Hiroko, another windup, says that ‘new people are more Japanese 
than the Japanese’ (p. 425) This sentiment is nearly perfectly analogous to Blade 
Runner: the film version of Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep 
where there is a sign relating to androids by the Tyrell Corporation stating ‘More 
Human than Human.’67 They are perceived as the improved human, yet they are only 
improved in what the liberal humanist subject deems necessary. The posthumans are 
seen as a commodity which ‘man’ can manipulate and create in whatever way he 
pleases, not recognising the posthuman as an autonomous being, such as an animal. 
 The humans of the novel also regard Emiko on several occasions as an animal. 
She is called ‘some other creature’ (p. 155) and ‘an animal’ (p. 154). Similar to Jaidee 
describing the cheshires as having no souls, Kanya carries on with the notion that 
windups ‘have no souls and have no kamma’ (p. 302). Following on from his short 
story ‘Yellow Card Man’, Bacigalupi had already stated that, ‘“it is perhaps the only 
thing a good Buddhist and a good Muslim and even the farang Grahamite Christians 
can agree on: windups have no souls.’”68 The posthuman and transgenic beings within 
the novel are regarded by humans as unnatural, soulless and a being that is not and 
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never will be regarded as human or equal to humans. A similar concept arises in 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go. Ishiguro’s dystopian novel introduces cloned 
inhabitants of a special school called Hailsham, who are believed by the majority of 
the population to not possess souls as ‘people tried to convince themselves that [they] 
weren’t really like [the clones].’69 Hailsham was set up in order for the students to 
create art so the teachers could portray to the world that these children did have souls 
as people tried to convince themselves that the clones were less than human. It did 
work for a period of time until more advanced clone research began to unfold and 
people were reminded of their fears:  
It’s one thing to create students, such as yourselves, for the donation 
process. But a generation of created children who’d take their place in 
society? Children demonstrably superior to the rest of us? Oh no. That 
frightened people. They recoiled from that.70 
 
This is an example of Descartes’ view on humanism that only humans possess a 
cognitive identity and both Ishiguro and Bacigalupi are critiquing this mindset and 
humanist ideology. Interestingly though, Hock Seng, on more than one occasion, 
refers to the white dominant males, Anderson Lake and the other ‘gaijin’ as creatures. 
And even Gibbons tells Kanya that ‘it’s easier to build a person impervious to blister 
rust than to protect an earlier version of the human creature’ (p. 345). There is an 
instance of a matter of perspective in the hierarchal ordering of not only humans and 
animals, but humans between themselves. Hock Seng is filled with vehemence for 
those that can control him and Gibbons simply believes he has potential control over 
anything; from his viewpoint, the whole human race is regarded as a ‘creature’ and 
effectively a prototype towards true human perfection highlighting his transhumanist 
views once again. 
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 The treatment of animals is no different in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake and The 
Year of the Flood where hybrid creatures are created at every turn. Alongside 
bobkittens (smaller than bobcats and less aggressive) there are also liobams (a 
mixture of lion and lamb melded together by a religious group); rakunks (the clean 
smell of a raccoon and temperament of a skunk, normally used as pets); wolvogs 
(dangerous wolf dogs); Mo’hairs ( sheep with multi coloured hair) and pigoons. The 
mere fact that Jimmy was allowed a rakunk as a pet when he was younger highlights 
just how normal it had become to view the genetically modified creatures as 
something acceptable. 
 Most notable of the transgenic animals are the pigoons. The pigoon is used to 
harvest organs for humans. Yet, the pigoon ends up being endowed with human 
characteristics: ‘we now have genuine human neocortex tissue growing in a pigoon. 
Finally, after all those duds!’ (p. 63). This later develops into a theme of underlying 
irony, which Atwood incorporates to show how ‘man’ is going too far in playing God. 
Atwood shows how the pigoons see Jimmy/Snowman as an enemy, and vice versa: 
There are too many pigoon tracks around here. Those beasts are clever 
enough to fake a retreat, then lurk around the next corner. They’d bowl him 
over, trample him, then rip him open, munch up the organs first. He knows 
their tastes. A brainy and omnivorous animal, the pigoon. Some of them 
may even have human neocortex tissue growing in their crafty, wicked 
heads. (p. 276) 
 
The fact that the pigoons have ‘human neocortex’ inside them highlights the nefarious 
actions of humankind. Yet is also seems to criticise that once the humans know there 
is human DNA within an animal, it immediately becomes more clever and more of a 
threat. In The Year of the Flood, Toby states ‘pigs are smart, they’ll keep her in mind, 
they won’t forgive her.’71 The human – animal boundary has blurred so that the 
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transgenic animals begin to have human characteristics. Even in The Handmaids Tale, 
devoid of genetic mutation, the pig marketers in the time said that ‘the pigs were 
curious, they liked to have something to think about’ (p. 79) which creates an 
uncanny feeling between humans and animals and whether animals do have conscious 
and rational thought. When Jimmy was younger, he was already worried when he 
visited the pigoons as ‘they glanced up at him as if they saw him, really saw him, and 
might have plans for him later’ (p. 30). The hierarchal difference between humans and 
animals is inverted within the novel, starting with Jimmy’s unease at being around 
them, to his inability to eat meat in case it contained pigoon flesh, to the pigoons 
stake-out of him during his trip to Paradice. When he was younger Jimmy says that: 
[He] was confused about who should be allowed to eat what. He didn’t want 
to eat a pigoon, because he thought of the pigoons as creatures much like 
himself. Neither he nor they had a lot of say in what was going on. (p. 24) 
 
Jimmy aligns himself with his mother who is the voice of irony, when she asks ‘that‘s 
all we need, more people with the brains of pigs. Don‘t we have enough of them 
already?’ (p. 64). Eventually Jimmy’s mother joins a rebel group intent on stopping 
genetic experimentation. Fukuyama points out that ‘there is today around the world a 
very powerful animal rights movement […]. The radical fringe of this movement has 
on occasion turned violent, bombing medical research labs and chicken processing 
plants.’72 Atwood incorporates this into her two novels by creating the rebel group 
‘Maddaddam’ who attack corporations who profit through using genetic engineering 
on plants and animals and turning them into a commodity.  
 To refer back to Derrida’s The Animal, Therefore I Am, he claims that ‘by 
means of genetic experimentation’ this has caused the 
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reduction of the animal not only to production and over- active reproduction of meat 
for consumption but also of all sorts of other end products, and all of that in the 
service of […] the so-called human well-being of man.73  
 
This demonstrates how it is not a matter of how posthuman entities are treated but 
instead focuses on man’s ‘well-being’. Derrida goes on to mention that ‘Animal is a 
word that men have given themselves the right to give’74 highlighting further the 
liberal humanist stance that humans take when deciding that animals are their own 
private property. The role reversal with the pigoons exemplifies the deconstruction of 
the liberal humanist subject as barriers begin to break down between the distinction of 
humans and animals.  
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2.2 The problem of extinction and immortality. 
 
To stay human is to break a limitation.75 
- ORYX AND CRAKE 
 
Human beings have always striven to reach perfection and ultimately create a Utopian 
dream world, especially in the nineteenth century, which was so ‘cluttered up with 
them.’76 It was only during the turn of the century and throughout the twentieth 
century that dark and horrific dystopian worlds began emerging. Atwood asks, ‘why 
is that when we grab for heaven […] we so often produce hell? […] Maybe it’s the 
lumpiness of human beings. What do you do with people who […] don’t or won’t fit 
into your grand scheme?’77 Due to the disastrous events in the twentieth century, for 
example Nazi Germany and the desire for an Aryan race, many became suspicious 
and wary of Utopian ideas, which could be a double-edged sword with unforeseen 
negative consequences. The desire for immortality and perfection is a huge flaw 
within the society of Atwood and Bacigalupi’s novels, resulting in the cataclysmic 
events that unfold within the novel and ask the reader: should we be seeking to 
improve ourselves beyond recognition? The transhumanist view promotes the idea 
that humans should be determined to improve themselves and follow the path of 
perfecting themselves and moving towards immortality, constantly bettering the 
previous model. Nick Bostrom argues that it would be good for us to become 
posthuman and defines the posthuman as possessing at least one ‘posthuman 
capacity.’78 These capacities he limits to three main features: healthspan, cognition 
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and emotion. Atwood and Bacigalupi raise the question of how effective is the change 
in a human when their posthuman counterparts are still partially ‘hard-wired’ to make 
the same mistakes despite how they are designed?  
 As shown by Gibbons in The Windup Girl, improved healthspan and quality of 
life is what he is campaigning for with the move to the posthuman: ‘Evolve or die’ (p. 
345) is his mantra, ‘refuse, and go the way of the dinosaurs and Felis domesticus’ (p. 
345). He views the extinction of a species as the right method in ridding the world of 
a weaker, defunct version. He tells Kanya, that it’s easier to build a person impervious 
to disease and aging than to ‘protect an earlier version of the human creature’ (p. 
345). Kanya instead insists that the New People are just a machine that ‘apes the 
motions of humanity […] a dangerous experiment that has been allowed to proceed 
too far’ and ‘a genetically engineered beast’ (p. 427). Gibbon’s transhumanist vision, 
is the threat to humankind. Whereas Kanya represents the liberal humanist subject, 
unable to accept the ‘other’ and fears it, Gibbons instead promotes an unhealthy 
version of New People and transgenic animals. Hayles states that if a subject ‘seems 
to present the posthuman as a transformation to be feared and abhorred rather than 
welcomed and embraced, that reaction has everything to do with how the posthuman 
is constructed and understood.’79 Even though Gibbons is accepting and welcomes the 
posthuman transformation, he himself still maintains an ownership over the end 
product. He himself has not ventured into the realm of posthumanism, instead he is 
decaying, surrounded by his posthuman servants. Because he is a creator of the new 
posthuman subject, he believes himself a god amongst them. Yet, as Haraway says at 
the end of The Cyborg Manifesto, she would ‘rather be a cyborg than a goddess.’80 
Gibbons may believe himself to be a god, yet ironically he is subpar to the new 
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‘improved’ New People and will be left along with the extinct population of humans 
if he were to get his way of ‘evolve or die’ with no middle ground.  
 Evolutionary change can be identified through three of the major characters in 
Atwood’s Oryx and Crake.81 Glenn (Crake) picks the codenames for the game 
Extinctathon and names Jimmy, Thickney – ‘a defunct Australian double-jointed bird 
that used to hang around in cemeteries’ (p. 93). Glenn names himself after the ‘Red-
necked Crake’, a rare bird that has a secretive nature. Then there is Oryx, who has no 
given name except by the men in her life who label her. Oryx does choose her own 
name based on the ‘Oryx Beisa’ but it is from a list that Crake hands her and had 
‘liked the idea of being a gentle water-conserving East African herbivore’ (p. 365). 
The transition from ordinary human names to animal names, particularly extinct or 
endangered animals, parodies the degeneration of man and deconstruction of the 
liberal humanist self. The animals, which are now extinct, are being used to 
characterise human traits and ‘man’ is regressing. Adding to this, Jimmy loses the 
name Thickney and transpires as ‘Snowman’ in the after apocalypse; an entity that is 
unrecognisable to the posthuman Crakers: ‘they don’t know what a snowman is, 
they’ve never seen snow’ (p. 8). The liminal structure of Jimmy’s differing names, 
portrays the shift from ‘man’ to ‘posthuman’. Jimmy is initially characterised by an 
extinct bird, something that used to exist but now does not. Then he moves to the 
name Snowman, at first an object unknown to the new posthumans but he adds, only 
to himself that he is the ‘Abominable Snowman – existing and not existing […] 
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known only through rumours’ (p. 8). Jimmy becomes an intangible entity, something 
not of the world, as he himself is a product eschewed from this new world.  
 Interestingly, the degeneration of man is itself parodied further in the novel by 
Jimmy’s pet rakunk, a product of ‘create-an-animal’ fun (p. 57). His mother, 
disdainful of the pet, asks will he call it ‘Bandit’ and Jimmy, in order to disagree with 
his mother instead opts for ‘Killer’, a more savage and criminal name, embodying one 
of human nature’s most terrible sins. Yet, Jimmy’s mother liberates Killer and Jimmy 
is outraged: ‘Killer was a tame animal, she’d be helpless on her own, she wouldn’t 
know how to fend for herself’ (pp. 70-71). Also it echoes when Haraway stated, 
‘every other living being except Man can be killed, but not murdered.’82 Killer, the 
animal is harmless but it highlights human beings humanist perception that an animal 
cannot be murdered they are simply killed. 
 In The Year of The Flood, these names become more common. The members 
of MaddAddam all possess names governed by extinct animals: ‘BLACK RHINO. 
WHITE SEDGE. IVORY-BILLED WOODPECKER. POLAR BEAR. INDIAN 
TIGER. LOTUS BLUE. SWIFT FOX’ (p. 351). Crake tells Jimmy ‘these people are 
Extinctathon’ (p. 351). As Patrick Murphy observes, ‘the western paradigm of human 
exceptionalism sustains the “belief in the radical independence of human beings from 
all else” including processes of evolution and extinction.’83 Atwood serves to expose 
this view as a statement human beings can hide behind. The text questions whether 
extinction is a more serious condition when it threatens the human and not the non-
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human and also asks ‘if the idea of justice applies to the nonhuman other.’84 Human 
beings have not noticed how long they have served the nonhuman an injustice in 
society. In Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale Offred notes that society will not be able 
to notice the detrimental effect it is causing itself as she muses that ‘nothing changes 
instantaneously: in a gradually heating bathtub you’d be boiled to death before you 
knew it’ (p. 66).  The reader is told that ‘we are a society dying […] of too much 
choice’ (p. 35). Yet the subject of ‘choice’ is a slippery term within itself, as the 
nonhuman other, those relegated to the status of ‘animal’ or posthuman do not have a 
choice. 
 Simplifying programming is a common feature of the dystopian genre where 
people are segregated and at least one portion of the population are reduced to serving 
one elementary function. In The Handmaids Tale, Offred is kept ‘for breeding 
purposes’ (p. 146), regarded as a ‘national resource’ (p. 75) and a ‘worthy vessel’ (p. 
75) and is often ‘washed, brushed, fed, like a prize pig’ (p. 79). A similar thing occurs 
in Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go. Ishiguro highlights the boundaries between the human 
and the posthuman through the portrayal of the students at Hailsham. The students 
primarily exist for one function and this deprived them of any humane depiction.  
For a long time you were kept in the shadows, and people did their best not 
to think about you. And if they did, they tried to convince themselves you 
weren’t really like us. That you were less than human, so it didn’t matter . . 
. Here was the world, requiring students to donate. While that remained the 
case, there would always be a barrier against seeing you as properly 
human.85  
It can be argued that the clones are situated on the same level as animals, through the 
way in which they are treated. Helena Pederson argues that ‘Hailsham operates on the 
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double logics of repression and protection – not unlike animal welfare organisations 
working for ‘humane’ treatment and improved conditions for animals who in the end 
still are destined for use and slaughter.’86 Originally in Oryx and Crake, the pigoons 
are created for one purpose only: 
The goal of the pigoon project was to grow an assortment of foolproof 
human-tissue organs in a transgenic knockout pig host – organs that would 
transplant smoothly and avoid rejection, but would also be able to fend off 
attacks by opportunistic microbes and viruses, of which there were more 
strains every year. (p. 25) 
 
In Oryx and Crake Jimmy asks Crake, ‘“What pays for all this?”’ (p. 344) in relation 
to the tour of the RejoovenEsense compound which is full of state-of-the-art luxuries 
and Crake replies: ‘“Grief in the face of inevitable death […] The wish to stop time. 
The human condition’” (p. 344). Crake defines the human condition as the desire and 
struggle for immortality and the impending mortality destined for humans. Atwood 
states: ‘We’re stuck with us, imperfect as we are; but we should make the most of us’ 
She argues that we should try to make things better but not to strive for perfection as 
‘that path leads to mass graves.’ 87 This foreshadows what occurs at the end of Oryx 
and Crake as Crake leads most of the human population to near extinction and as 
Gibbons says, ‘an accidental plague kills just as surely’ (p. 351). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
86 Helena Pederson, ‘Is ‘the posthuman’ educable? On the convergence of educational philosophy, 
animal studies, and posthumanist theory’ in Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 
31, 2010, p. 239.   
87 Atwood, In Other Worlds SF and the Human Imagination, p. 95. 
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3.     
Human Commodification: The posthuman as a commodity may come to exceed 
the destiny intended for it in a capitalist model of production and consumption. 
 
 
 
There is a stark contrast, which occurs in both Atwood’s and Bacigalupi’s novels, 
which highlights intolerance for diversity of any kind, through the power struggle of 
the Corporations at the top and the dire treatment of the proletariat at the bottom. In 
the nineteenth century ‘when one thought about the economy in that period, the focus 
was almost always on production.’88 Yet, in the future worldviews that the two 
novelists provide the reader with, it seems that the focus lies heavily on consumption 
and as Mary Galbreath states: ‘human exceptionalism provides justification for 
humanity’s consumptive habits through self–separation and dominance, over other 
life forms.’89 Both novels view the posthuman being as a commodity, as private 
property, which they can distribute and deign to do whatever they wish with. To 
demonstrate the deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject, Atwood and 
Bacigalupi present a binary opposition between the apparent commodification of 
posthuman entities and the less noticeable commodification of humans themselves by 
each other. The human being wishes to dominate other life forms whereas the 
posthumans aim to break out of their subservient role in the capitalist model of 
production and consumption. 
 In Atwood’s novels, there is no need for a government body as the 
Corporations and their subsidiaries hold all the power through global capitalism 
where ‘the compounds produce and market food, medicine, and entertainment with no 
apparent government regulation and no intervention on the part of non- corporate 
                                                        
88 Nathan Jurgenson and George Ritzer, ‘Production, Consumption, Prosumption: The nature of 
capitalism in the age of the digital 'prosumer’ in Journal of Consumer Culture, 13 (2010), p. 14 
89 Marcy Galbreath, ‘A Consuming Read: the Ethics of Food in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake’ 
in Florida Gulf Coast University’s 2nd International Humanities and Sustainability Conference, Fort 
Myers, Florida, October 7-9, (2010), p.1. 
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society.’90 The Corporations attempt to take control of everyone and it is the 
pleeblanders from the compounds that are treated the worst, being considered 
substandard human beings. They are used as test subjects by the compound scientists 
in a similar way to animals during the nineteenth century, which were also seen as 
lesser creatures.91 Crake uses the pleeblanders to first test his BlyssPluss pill on. This 
is a direct comparison between the capitalist, Crake, and the proletariat, the 
pleeblanders, who are commodified in order to test a drug which will become fatal to 
nearly all humankind. Crake can be identified as having the same mindset as Gibbons; 
people are not human to him, everything is a subject which can be turned into a 
commodity for his own end gain. Atwood uses dark humour in order to satirise the 
cold, unfeeling way the scientists treated the proleteriat: ‘A couple of the test subjects 
had literally fucked themselves to death, several had assaulted old ladies and 
household pets, and there had been a few unfortunate cases of priapism and split 
dicks’ (p. 348). And Crake counts on ‘the tide of human desire, the desire for more 
and better’ (p. 296) to profit greatly and to drive forward sales.  
 Cleverly, Atwood inverts the natural capitalistic dominance through the use of 
Crake. Since he is creating a drug to wipe out the human race, he has not set his sights 
on any monetary profit. Crake capsizes the impending vision of a totalitarian 
dystopian future with the invention of the Crakers. Crake tricks HelthWyzer into 
believing he is creating the Crakers in order for people to pick their favourite genetic 
combinations, whilst instead he is plotting the extinction of the human race as Jimmy 
says ‘“Didn’t you get a bit carried away’” (p. 359). Crake’s posthuman creations are 
his utopian dream. He strives for a world where there is no technology, no religion, no 
                                                        
90 Beth Irwin, ‘Global Capitalism in Oryx and Crake in University of Wisconsin Oshkosh. Oshkosh 
Scholar, 4 (2009), pp. 45. 
91 http://www.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-bin/wordpress/2010/07/animal-research/ - ‘Animal 
Research: The Ethics of Animal Experimentation’ (Accessed 29th August, 2013) 
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massive overpopulation worries or ecological decline. It is through his means of 
achieving this utopian world that Atwood highlights the fine balance between utopian 
ideas and dystopian results. Crake creates the BlyssPluss Pill that simultaneously 
would protect against sexually transmitted disease, provide an unlimited supply of 
libido and sexual prowess and prolong youth. Yet, the fourth capability, Crake 
decides not to advertise but references it to Jimmy as acting also as ‘a sure-fire-one-
time-does-it-all-birth-control pill’ (p. 347) not only sterlising them, as Jimmy thinks, 
but exterminating them.  
 Throughout the novel, drugs are used consistently in order to control human 
beings. One evening, Crake walks Jimmy through a hypothetical scenario where he 
states that sooner or later all diseases will be cured by the large outfit HelthWyzer and 
he asks Jimmy, what will happen after that. Jimmy, un-responding, is prompted by 
Crake who states, ‘“You’d need more sick people, Or else – and it might be the same 
thing  - more diseases’” (p. 247). Jimmy, quite naively, replies that they keep 
discovering new diseases and Crake dismisses this: ‘“Not discovering […] they’re 
creating them’” (p. 247). Crake describes how HelthWyzer imbed hostile bioforms 
into their vitamin pills to infect the population and naturally they develop the 
antidotes at the same time, but hold them in reserve, in order to accumulate high 
profits. Crake states that, ‘“the best diseases, from a business point of view, […] 
would be those that cause lingering illnesses’” (p. 248). Therefore, the health 
corporations are controlling the population and gaining a maximum profit through the 
production and consumption of new diseases and their subsequent, yet scarce, 
antidotes. This is hinted at in the case of Toby’s mother in The Year of the Flood. Due 
to Toby’s father refusing to sell his house, her mother suddenly develops a ‘strange 
illness’ (p. 31) and having never been ill before and always taking ‘a dose of 
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HelthWyzer Hi-Potency VitalVite supplements daily’ she continued to ‘wither away’ 
(p. 31). This emphasizes the control that the Corporations have over the lives of 
human beings. Toby explains how the CorpSeCorps had ‘started as a private security 
firm for the Corporations, but then they’d taken over when the local police forces 
collapsed for lack of funding’ […] and people liked that at first […] but now 
CorpSeCorps were sending their tentacles everywhere’ (p. 30). They not only control 
what people are buying, they also control life and death, bordering again on assuming 
the position of a god. Already, in current conditions, ‘a number of commentators have 
argued, biomedical research has now become inseparable from the drive to generate 
intellectual property, with the consequence that illness and health have become major 
fields for corporate activity and the generation of the shareholder.’92 Atwood seems to 
drive this message that anything can become corporate property.  
 Anderson Lake also comments on human nature’s indulgence in creating and 
making freely available, products that will gain themselves profit rather than benefit 
the needs of other human beings. After rolling a cigarette, Lake is amused that ‘the 
Thai’s, even amid starvation, have found the time and energy to resurrect nicotine 
addiction. He wonders if human nature ever really changes’ (p. 91). In direct 
comparison to this, the Crakers are able to break free from the capitalistic model of 
production and consumption, in terms of control through drugs, in that Crake creates 
them so they have ‘immunity from microbes, [that] what had until now been done 
with drugs would soon be innate’ (p. 358). The Crakers are seen as the ‘floor models’ 
(p. 305), initially a commodity created by Crake in order to design consumers’ perfect 
traits. Yet, their creation destabilises the status quo on which late capitalisim was 
built, as the Crakers are physically superior to their creator. 
                                                        
92 Clare Hanson, Eugenics, Literature, and Culture in Post-war Britain (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 
156 
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 A similar theme occurs in Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl. Thailand is seen as a 
third world country and the fact that they have their own food supply is a threat to 
Anderson Lake’s business empire. Constantly on Lake’s mind is the fact that: ‘Blister 
rust is mutating every three seasons now. Recreational generippers are hacking into 
our designs for TotalNutrient Wheat and SoyPRO. Our last grain of HiGro corn only 
beat weevil predation by sixty percent’ (p. 8). Lake is left wondering on more than 
one occasion that ‘somewhere in this city a generipper is busily toying with the 
building blocks of life. Re-engineering long-extinct DNA to fit post-Contraction 
circumstances, to survive despite the assaults of blister rust, Nippon genehack weevil 
and cibiscosis’ (p. 93-94). In his future world, ‘generipping’ is seen as recreational. It 
could even be argued that the illegitimate genehacking is a revolution against the 
corporations who, not only have to fear each other’s competition, but also that of 
vigilantes or malicious hackers. Similar to the Crakers, the posthuman subjects of 
‘windups’ are created so that they ‘have perfect eyesight and perfect skin and disease 
and cancer-resistant genes’ (p. 50). They are not involved in the arms race between 
producing and consuming different diseases and the effects of this on human society. 
They are created instead so that they are impervious to this strain of capitalist and 
economic control.  
 Bangkok, Thailand, is presented as a nation-state, and one that has not yet 
succumbed to the economic colonisation that the agri-corporations, notably from 
Western countries, have implemented in several other countries. Thailand has stayed 
independent against the rest of the world, acting against takeover by the large 
corporations since the Contraction and resulting in one of the most habitable countries 
left with a thriving population. Trade Minister Akkarat tells Lake: ‘The seedbank has 
kept us independent of your kind. […] When India, Vietnam and Burma all fell to you 
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we stood strong’ (p. 217). One such product from the Thai seedbank is the Ngaw, 
which Lake encounters in the very first pages: ‘[he] turns the strange hairy fruit in his 
hand. It carries no stink of cibiscosis. No scab of blister rust. No graffiti of genehack 
weevil engraves its skin. […] Ngaw. A mystery’ (p. 2). From the introductory pages 
of The Windup Girl, the reader is instantly being alerted to the fact that a fruit which 
‘shouldn’t exist. Yesterday it didn’t’ (p. 2), is already being scrutinized for disease 
and parasites and that it is unfathomable for Lake, and also dangerous to realise its 
resistance to these strains. In order for his company to maintain its position of power 
as one of the corporate leaders of the global food chain, Lake is resolute to uncover 
the seedbank and halt the speed in which new products are being created. This is 
similar to Jimmy’s dad in Atwood’s novel, where he argues that ‘the kidnapping of a 
pigoon and its finely honed genetic material by a rival outfit would have been a 
disaster’ (p. 29). If another Corporation got its hands on the Pigoon then they would 
lose out on the ultimate profit to be made. 
 There is no transformation of the state economically in Thailand and as much 
as the Environmental Ministry despises the transnationals, General Akkarat of the 
Trade Ministry still allows the ‘farang’ (p. 60) or ‘gaijin’ to trade and with this 
economic dependence on the West, there is no real freedom from colonialism. John 
Hodges argues that ‘in general, Western society has lost its balance by allowing, or 
encouraging, the business and economic component of society to dominate the whole 
of life and to shape human community.’93 Jaidee, the fighting tiger of the 
Environment Ministry, even confesses that he feels this way when he tells Kanya, 
‘why else do we let them squat out on Koh Angrit? In case we need them. In case we 
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fail, and must go begging for their rice and wheat and soy’ (p. 115). The Thai society 
is trying to be independent but there is still a need for the Calorie companies. The 
detestation is constantly flowing underneath the text, as is the vehemence the Thai 
feel due to their dependence on these corporations. Even Emiko, the hated, genetic 
reject who is seen as worthless, wonders: ‘If they met her or an AgriGen calorie man, 
it is hard to say which they would rather see mulched first’ (p. 54). In Atwood’s 
novel, in a neo-colonial sense, when Jimmy asks Crake where did he get the test 
subjects from for his clinical trials, Crake replies, ‘“From the poorer countries. Pay 
them a few dollars, they don’t even know what they’re taking’” (p. 349). In both 
novels, the vulnerable in society are being colonised by corporations or living with 
the threat of colonisation by the calorie companies and the resultant exploitation for 
profit.  
 Timothy Morton argues that ‘what’s wrong about genetic engineering is that it 
turns life forms into private property to enrich huge corporations.’94 The critic 
Andrew Hageman compares this sentiment towards Emiko from Bacigalupi’s The 
Windup Girl, who is seen as ‘private property’ but to expand further on this idea, it 
can be argued that any ‘life form’, anything with living cells, can be transformed into 
private property, such as crops and disease as described above. Even in Atwood’s 
novel, the reclusive genius Crake himself is seen as a commodity: ‘Crake was top of 
the class. The bidding for him by the rival EduCompounds at the Student Auction was 
brisk, and he was snatched up at a high price by the Watson-Crick Institute (p. 173).  
Though, the posthuman subject, Emiko, in Bacigalupi’s novel is able to liberate 
herself from being defined as someone else’s possession and in the process 
destabilises the status quo of production and consumption. Emiko first tells Anderson 
                                                        
94 Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010), p.86. 
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Lake that, “‘my body is not mine […] The men who designed me, they make me do 
things I cannot control. As if their hands are inside me. Like a puppet, yes?’” (p. 262) 
Emiko remembers the lessons she had to learn: ‘“What are you?” “New People.” 
“What is your honour?” “It is my honour to serve.” “Who do you honour?” “I 
honour my patron”’ (p. 220). Emiko’s old patron Mizumi-sensei tells her, alongside 
other windups, that ‘their duty was to serve, their honour was to serve, and their 
reward would come in the next life, when they became fully human’ (p. 221). This 
statement parallels Gibbons’ views that humans must become windups in order to 
survive. The liberal humanist subject begins to fall apart as the windups, the superior 
beings, are told their goal is to become fully human in a world where humanity is 
constantly being critiqued. For most of the novel, Emiko does adhere to her servile 
life, facing gross degradation as a sex slave for the entertainment of human beings. 
Emiko does try to civilly leave her position as she asks Raleigh, ‘“I wish to leave this 
place”’ (p. 226) even though she does not have a new patron. Raleigh humours her by 
telling her that she can leave, though he knows she never will. Ultimately, towards the 
end of the novel, something snaps within Emiko and after she kills Raleigh 
mercilessly, she massacres one of the most powerful men in Thailand, the Somdet 
Chaopraya and his men, stating ‘all of them are moving too too slow. None of them 
are New People’ (p. 368). Yashimoto tells Kanya ‘“it is surprising […], that one has 
shaken off her training. Unwelcome news. New People serve us. It should not have 
happened’” (p. 425) Even though Emiko is able to liberate herself from the men ‘who 
hurt her most’ (p. 367) and exceed the destiny set out for her, there is still a long way 
to go until all windups are able to break free from their servile roles under human 
rule. This is particularly powerful at the end of the novel where Gibbons tells her he 
can create fertile windups, give her a purpose and her own fate and ‘much much 
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more’ (p. 505.) Ultimately, it is the posthuman entities that are able to break down 
liberal humanist values and release themselves from the capitalistic model. 
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Conclusion 
The Rise of the Posthuman: How humans and posthumans can survive together. 
 
 
There are signs already in place that signify the blurring of the boundaries between 
the human and the posthuman. The deconstruction of the human defined by liberal 
humanism, an ideology based on human values and concerns, paves the way for an 
inevitable move to posthumanism. As already discussed, the human is in danger of 
disappearing completely and this has been demonstrated through the issues of another 
epistemic shift, the blurring of boundaries between humans and animals and the 
ownership and capitalist domination of anything deemed by the liberal humanist as 
‘other’. Though, it is not completely the end for human beings, it is more the 
disintegration and subsequent demise of the ideologies of the nineteenth century 
‘man’ along with all his human values and concerns. Though Foucault speculated that 
‘man’ would disappear, it does not necessarily mean that all of humankind would 
perish. Hayles mentions that: 
Although some current versions of the posthuman point towards the anti-
human and the apocalyptic, we can craft others that will be conducive to the 
long-range survival of humans and of the other life-forms, biological and 
artificial, with whom we share the planet and ourselves.95 
 
There is a chance that human beings and posthuman beings will be able to coexist as 
equal subjects. Ultimately, it can be argued that it is not the posthuman being that acts 
as a threat to humanity and that it is the current values and concerns of human beings 
in the present that are a threat to themselves. The ‘god like’ need to have control and 
dominance over any other species and deem themselves superior is potentially human 
beings’ greatest pitfall and will eventually lead to their downfall. Posthumanism states 
                                                        
95 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, p. 
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that the human does not need to be the only, or even the central, model for a 
worthwhile, valuable life.  
 Bacigalupi explores the central model as being something that is not 
determined by wealth, position or even gender. This ending verges on a Utopian 
culmination, where there are no longer any corporations left within the world. In a 
biblical sense, an eschatological flood at the end of the novel, has taken what was 
wrong with the world and has left the survivors to create a new world, one with a 
different ideology that will not be consumed by greed and capitalistic profit. At the 
end of the novel, the two genetic creations: Gibbons’ ladyboy Kip, who represents an 
amalgamation of gender, and Emiko are left with Gibbons. The decision to end the 
novel with these three characters highlight Bacigalupi’s want for a new future where 
it is not controlled and determined by society’s elite. Gibbons, even though he 
possesses traits of the liberal humanist subject, tells the windups that he can progress 
their race and will ultimately die soon. Interestingly, Emiko also embodies an Eve like 
figure, yet exceeds the boundaries of being regarded as a construct made merely for 
man’s company. Atwood’s Oryx and Crake follows this same premise with the 
‘waterless flood’, a biblical analogy to the termination of liberal humanist ideology. 
 The two other novels that complete Atwood’s trilogy, The Year of the Flood 
and Maddaddam are more primarily concerned with the effect of the human and 
posthuman in respect to ecology and environmentalism. The last novel in Atwood’s 
trilogy, Maddaddam, only recently released, portrays a dismal fate where Toby 
dreams that ‘the world has been changed utterly; that the familiar is long dead; that 
everything she used to love has been swept away’ (p. 32). She carries the same 
ideology as ‘Snowman-the-Jimmy’ that her past world is now gone, and she is still 
clutching to remnants of the past. Maddaddam mentions that ‘speculations about what 
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the world would be like after human control of it ended had been […] a queasy form 
of popular entertainment’ (p. 32). It had been entertaining to view the fate of the 
world, yet signified by the word ‘queasy’, it is still something which scared and 
unnerved most people who would not want to share their world with a being 
potentially more powerful and more improved than them. In relation to this, Toby 
laments that ‘history is over’ (p. 33). Yet, arguably, it is only the history of the liberal 
humanist subject that has ceased to exist, it is their history that will not continue, as 
they will not survive in a world where human beings and posthuman beings can be 
coequal and not have a god-like presence over them. To reiterate Haraway’s final 
words, ‘I’d rather be a cyborg than a goddess.’96 
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